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I. INTRODUCTION
On February 2, 1990, South African President Frederik W. de
Klerk announced the unbanning of the African National Congress
(ANC).1 On February 11, 1990, he released jailed ANC leader Nelson
Mandela.2 These moves undoubtedly will have not only dramatic do-
mestic effects but also could have international ramifications as countries
reassess their relationships with the South African government and the
ANC.
The United States has had an ambiguous relationship with both the
South African goverment and the ANC. The U.S. has simultaneously
imposed economic sanctions on South Africa and refused to sign United
Nations resolutions condemning South Africa.3
On January 10, 1989, President-elect George Bush issued a report
which- listed the African National Congress as one of fifty-two organiza-
tions around the world described as "more notorious terrorist groups."
Four days later, Charles Redman, the spokesman for the United States
Department of State, repudiated the Pentagon report.4
This Note suggests that there must be a clarification of United States
policy with respect to the African National Congress and the present
government of South Africa.
The question of a United States foreign policy with respect to the
South African government and the ANC is best investigated by looking
to the international law of recognition. The collective action of states
recognizing and derecognizing other states defines who will be actors in
the international legal system.5 It is the process of recognition that de-
fines relationships within the world community. This Note suggests that
the South African government should be derecognized by the United
1. Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 3, 1990 (BC cycle).
2. Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 9, 1990 (BC cycle).
3. See Mandela's Release Prompts U.S. to Take Fresh Look at Sanctions, Christian Sci.
Monitor, Feb. 14, 1990, at 1, see Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A.
Res. 42/23, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 42, U.N. Doc. A/42/49 (1988).
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at L3.
5. J. DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 7-12 (1987).
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States because it is an illegal and illegitimate government. Simultane-
ously, the ANC should be afforded diplomatic recognition as a legitimate
representative of the people of South Africa.
President de Klerk's pronouncements do not change the status quo
in South Africa. The people of South Africa are not represented in inter-
national relations with the United States because the present South Afri-
can government is not representative of the majority of the population.
Given the formidable position of the U.S. as a world power, it is unac-
ceptable that the majority of the South African people have no official
channel of diplomatic communication with the United States. This Note
does not suggest that the ANC should be recognized as the government
of South Africa since recognition as a legitimate government can only be
granted after the South African people have chosen their own representa-
tive through a free and democratic electoral process. However, in the
interim between the derecognition of the apartheid government and rec-
ognition of a legitimate goverment, the United States should recognize
legitimate representatives of the South African people. These legitimate
representatives can be detemined under the theory of collective
recognition.
This Note first provides a brief explanation of the international law
of recognition. Second, it presents the international legal status of both
the apartheid government and the ANC and concludes that the United
States should adopt a policy of collective recognition. Under the theory
of collective recognition, the ANC should be afforded diplomatic recog-
nition as a legitimate representative of the South African people.
II. DEFINING RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER
ENTITIES: LOOKING TO THE LAW OF
RECOGNITION
The law of recognition is fraught with inconsistencies and has been
plagued by the vacillation of states who use recognition as an instrument
of political power.6 This Note does not attempt to posit a new theory of
recognition but proposes that the "collective recognition" theory most
accurately describes the current practice of states.7 Collective recogni-
tion is the theory that when a state or government has been recognized
by the vast majority of states, it has status as an international person.8
6. L.T. GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS: THE PRACTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (1978).
7. See generally J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 7-12.
8. Id.
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An indicator of collective recognition is status in the United Nations.
John Dugard, author of Recognition and the United Nations, suggests
that status in the UN certifies an entity as an "international person,"9
thereby eliminating the anomalous situation that arises when an entity is
"recognized by State A but not recognized by State B, and [is] therefore
apparently both an 'international person' and not an 'international per-
son' at the same time."' Collective recognition based on status in the
United Nations also cures the inequity of states arbitrarily recognizing an
entity as a state, thereby imbuing that state with international status.1 '
Dugard focuses on the recognition of states and refers scholars to
other sources for the practice of recognition of governments. 2 South
Africa is undoubtedly a member of the international community.' 3
However, the collective recognition theory should apply to recognition of
the government of South Africa. Although the State of South Africa
clearly exists, there are two problems: (1) the population and territory
which qualify South Africa for statehood are faulty; and (2) South Africa
attained the qualifications of statehood in violation of peremptory rules
of international law, in particular the principles of nondiscrimination and
self-determination. The State of South Africa, as defined by the
apartheid government, is therefore without "legal effect" as a state.' 4 Be-
cause of these defects in South Africa's statehood, the representative of
the government of South Africa has been derecognized by the United
Nations.'5 Concurrently, the ANC has been recognized by the United
Nations, not as an alternative government, but as a legitimate representa-
tive of the South African people.' 6 The theory of collective recognition
may help the United States to define its relationship with the faulty state
of South Africa, its present apartheid government, and the alternative
representative of the South African people, the African National
Congress.
9. Id. at 79.
10. Id. (quoting J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 138 (6th ed. 1963)).
11. Id. at 80.
12. Id. at 5.
13. Suttner, Has South Africa Been Illegally Excluded from the UN General Assembly?, 17
COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 279, 299 (1984).
14. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 131; see infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
16. Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A. Res. 40/64, 40 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 32, 35, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1986).
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III. DEFINING THE UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP
WITH SOUTH AFRICA: WHAT IS THE LEGAL
STATUS OF THE STATE AND THE
GOVERNMENT?
Although South Africa has met the Montevideo criteria for state-
hood, under more contemporary statehood definitions the South African
state is faulty, and our relations with a "faulty" state must be carefully
considered.
A. The Statehood of South Africa
The most widely accepted criteria for statehood are defined by the
Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States. 17 As set
down in article 1 of the Montevideo Convention, an entity qualifies as a
state and will be regarded as a person of international law if "[t]he State
... possess[es] the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population;
(b) a defined territory; (c) [a] government; and (d) the capacity to enter
into relations with the other States.""8
These criteria of statehood are customary international law.19 They
have become law out of a "'concordant practice by a number of states
... over a considerable period of time,' with a conviction 'that the prac-
tice is required by, or consistent with, prevailing international law.' "20
Since the ratification of the Montevideo Convention, notions of self-de-
termination and human rights have become an important part of interna-
tional law.2" Contemporary theorists suggest that self-determination and
human rights should be added to the Montevideo criteria for statehood
or attach to the criteria for government recognition because they affect
the Montevideo requirement that a government have effective control
over the national territory.22 However, rather than making these princi-
ples a prerequisite to the existence of a state, the practices of the United
Nations General Assembly and Security Council suggest that states
which meet the Montevideo criteria for statehood but violate peremptory
norms of international law (for example, principles of self-determination
17. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 127.
18. Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, art. 1, 49
Stat. 3097, 3100, 3 Bevans 145, 147, 165 L.N.T.S. 19, 25.
19. Asmal, Apartheid and International Law, 1 REv. CONTEMP. L. 57, 62 (1979).
20. This is the classic definition of customary law articulated by Judge Manley 0. Hud-
son. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER, & N. LEECH, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 168 (3rd ed. 1988).
21. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 127.
22. Id. at 127-28.
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or nondiscrimination) are without legal effect as states.23
In its 1987 Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States, the American Law Institute uses the Montevideo Convention defi-
nition of statehood but adds: "A state has an obligation not to recognize
or treat as a state an entity that has attained the qualifications for state-
hood as a result of a threat or use of armed force in violation of the
United Nations Charter."24 A state which violates the peremptory
norms of self-determination and human rights is not nonexistent, but
rather void ab initio by reason of its illegality.25
Clearly, South Africa meets the Montevideo criteria of statehood.
South Africa has a permanent population, a defined territory, a govern-
ment, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.26 There
are, however, two important qualifications to South Africa's statehood
which create an obligation of nonrecognition: problems with the defini-
tion of South Africa's population and the definition of its territory.
The "population" of the present South African regime comprises
only white settlers and their descendants. 27 The black peoples of South
Africa, those whom the government classifies as Coloured, Indian, and
African, are denied citizenship by the South African Constitution. They
have no right to participate in the government which purports to repre-
sent them. 28 Thus, the apartheid government is without the capacity to
speak on behalf of the black population.
The question of what constitutes the "territory" of the South Afri-
can state has been raised in the United Nations as well as by legal theo-
rists. Under the law of collective recognition, the bantustans, the
territories set aside by the apartheid government as independant home-
lands for some of the African tribes, must be considered part of the terri-
tory of South Africa and not independent states. The borders of South
Africa clearly include the bantustans, and yet the apartheid government
denies that it is the government of the bantustans. 29 No state other than
23. Id. at 130-31.
24. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 201-202 (1987). Reporter's note 5 to § 202 clarifies; "In principle, an entity that has ac-
quired statehood unlawfully is ineligible for admission to an organization open only to states."
Id. § 202.
25. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 130.
26. Theodoropoulos, The Dual Status of the Republic of South Africa in International
Law, 21 INDIAN J. INT'L L. 563, 573 (1981).
27. Id.
28. S. AFR. CONST. art. 52, reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, at South Africa 66 (A. Blaustein & G. Flanz eds. 1984).
29. The South African government passed the Bantu Authorities Act in 1951. It created
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South Africa has recognized the bantustans as independent "states," and
this isolation of a nonrecognized state undermines any claim that it is a
state."° For all practical purposes, without the collective recognition of
the United Nations, the bantustans are not independent states.31 The
people of the bantustans are, therefore, without representation in the in-
ternational community, and a significant portion of the territory of South
Africa has no recognized government.
B. The Legal Status of the South African Government
1. Illegality of the Apartheid Regime
The question of the apartheid government's legal status under inter-
national law has been addressed by many authors.32 In addition to vio-
lating customary international law, apartheid is also illegal as a breach of
jus cogens norms.
Norms having the character ofjus cogens are so fundamental as to
be considered international public policy and not merely customary in-
ternational law.33 There has been much debate about which principles
qualify as peremptory norms.3 4 However, two principles violated by the
present South African government are clearlyjus cogens, the prohibition
of racial discrimination and apartheid, and the right of self-
determination.35
One of the consequences of a breach ofjus cogens is nonrecognition
by the United Nations and an obligation of nonrecognition by other
states.36
The prohibition of systematic racial discrimination and apartheid
has its source in the United Nations Charter, international conventions,
and customary international law.37 Numerous General Assembly and
Security Council resolutions have declared that apartheid, in particular,
tribal, regional, and territorial government authorities. 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUN-
TRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 28, at South Africa 7.
30. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 123-24.
31. G.A. Res. 35/206A, 35 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 29, 30, U.N. Doc. A/35/48
(1980); G.A. Res. 34/93G, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 29, 33, U.N. Doc. A/34/46
(1979); G.A. Res. 32/105N, 32 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 45) at 30, 40, U.N. Doc. A/32/45
(1977); G.A. Res. 31/6A, 31 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/39 (1976).
32. See, eg., Kiapi, The Status of Apartheid in International Law, 17 INDIAN J. INT'L L.
57, 57 (1977). Under international law apartheid is illegal as a violation of human rights, as
genocide, as slavery, as a crime against humanity, and as exploitation of the worker. Id. at 59.
33. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 138.
34. Id. at 151.
35. Id. at 156-62.
36. Id. at 136.
37. Id. at 156.
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is a violation of the peremptory norm of nondiscrimination. 38 The Inter-
national Court of Justice also condemned apartheid in its Namibia Opin-
ion. Judge Ammoun wrote: "The equality demanded.., is something of
vital interest to us here, on the one hand, because it is the foundation of
other human rights which are no more than its corollaries, and, on the
other hand, because it naturally rules out racial discrimination and
apartheid, which are the gravest of the facts with which South Africa...
stands charged. ' '39
The International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment
of the Crime of Apartheid condemned apartheid in article I, declaring it a
"crime against humanity."'' 4 The Convention further states, "[I]nhuman
acts resulting from the policies and practices of apartheid and similar
policies and practices of racial segregation and discrimination, as defined
in article II of this Convention, are crimes violating the principles of in-
ternational law, in particular the purposes and principles of the Charter
of the United Nations .. .4" The Seminar on the Legal Status of the
Apartheid Regime and other Legal Aspects of the Struggle Against
Apartheid (organized under the auspices of the Special Committee
Against Apartheid) accepted that "if nondiscrimination is a case ofjus
cogens, [then] apartheid, perhaps the most monstrous form of racial-dis-
crimination, also constitutes a specific and particular case of a violation
ofjus cogens."'42
The right to self-determination as expressed in international juris-
prudence originated in the United Nations Charter4 3 and the Declara-
tion on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples. 4 A comprehensive discussion of the subject was undertaken by
Hector Gros Espiell, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.a" He cited the
38. Id. at 157.
39. Asmal, Apartheid and International Law, REV. CONTEMP. INT'L L. 57, 71 (1979)
(quoting Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 57
(Advisory Opinion June 21)).
40. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
Apartheid, annex, art. 1, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 75, 75, U.N. Doc.
A/9030 (1973).
41. Id.
42. Declaration Adopted by the Seminar on the Legal Status of the Apartheid Regime and
Other Legal Aspects of the Struggle Against Apartheid, 39 U.N. G.A. Annex (Agenda Item 31)
at 10, U.N. Doe A/39/324-S/16709 (1984).
43. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55.
44. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 66, U.N. Doe A/4684 (1961).
45. H. GROS ESPIELL, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION: REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
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International Law Commission and the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties as having specifically called the right of self-determination a
jus cogens norm.46 The International Court of Justice affirmed the exist-
ence of self-determination as a fundamental international legal principle
in the Western Sahara case in 1975.17
The right to self-determination has been progressively defined by the
UN General Assembly. Its essence is the right of a group of people to be
free from colonial subjugation.4" Although not a colonial power in the
traditional sense of having overseas colonies, the apartheid government
of South Africa is a "prototype of a colonial power" because it rules its
black population through a policy of "deliberate subordination of the
vast majority of the people to an inferior status."49 The South African
government has articulated as its main purpose the keeping of the black
population in a state of perpetual subjugation. 0 The apartheid govern-
ment admits that the African peoples of South Africa are non-self-gov-
erning. The government has, until recently, blatantly stated that it has
no intention of granting them self-government and rejects the right of the
UN to regulate or supervise its policies.5
The South African government's attempted "reforms," 52 have been
rejected by the UN Commission on Human Rights as continuing to ex-
RAPPORTEUR OF THE SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTEC-
TION OF MINORITIES, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/405/Rev.1, U.N. Sales No. E.79.XIV.5
(1980).
46. Id. at 11.
47. Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12 (Advisory Opinion Jan. 3, 1975).
48. Gorelick, Apartheid and Colonialism, 19 COMP. & INT'L L.J. S. AFR. 70 (1986).
49. W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 136 (1977); see also H. GROS ESPIELL, supra note 45, at 6.
50. South African Prime Minister Verwoerd said:
Reduced to its simplest form the problem is nothing else than this: we want to keep
South Africa White .... 'Keeping it White' can only mean one thing, namely, White
domination, not 'leadership', not 'guidance', but 'control', 'supremacy'. If we are
agreed that it is the desire of the people that the White man should be able to con-
tinue to protect himself by retaining White domination ... we say that it can be
achieved by separate development.
W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, supra note 49, at 136-37 (quoting U.N., APARTHEID IN SOUTH AF-
RICA 11 (1963)).
51. Id. at 138. The recent moves by President de Klerk may indicate a retraction from
this position but at this time there have been no formal moves towards allowing self-
government.
52. See Address by State President P.W. Botha at the opening of the third session of the
eighth Parliament of the Republic of South Africa (Jan. 31, 1986), reprinted in 14 CONSTITU-
TIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 28, at South Africa Supp. 9, 12-14, in
which the President refers to, for example, the establishment of a single education department,
a uniform identity document for all groups, and a restructuring of provincial governments as
potential reforms.
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clude the majority black population from participating in the political,
social, economic, and cultural life of their country and continuing to
deny the black population their full citizenship rights.13 While President
de Klerk's recent unbanning of the ANC and release of Nelson Mandela
are positive steps, they are not moves towards self-government or even
integration of the majority population into the present government
structure.
The right of self-determination is articulated in the Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations54 and the Definition of Aggression." The Declaration on Prin-
ciples of International Law proclaims that every State has "a duty to
promote... realization of the principles of equal rights and self-determi-
nation of peoples.. ." and states that no action shall be taken to disrupt
the territorial integrity or national unity of a "government representing
the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race,
creed or colour."56 The General Assembly's Definition of Aggression
provides that nothing in the definition can prejudice the right of self-
determination, freedom, and independence of peoples under "colonial
and racist regimes or other forms of alien domination."57 The test for
suppression of self-determination, within the meaning of international
law, is primarily whether the government is indigenous and not restricted
to one race or a minority of the population to the exclusion of the major-
ity of the people. 8 The right to self-determination is violated when the
government is a colonial or other alien occupation force, ruling at the
expense of the indigenous people 9.5  The apartheid Parliament, by the
terms of the South African Constitution, is dominated by whites.6
South African lawyer and legal scholar, Albie Sachs, characterized the
53. Comm'n on Hum. Rts. Res. 1987/14, 1987 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 5) at 50, 52,
U.N. Doe. E/1987/18 [E/CN.4/1987/60] (1987).
54. G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, 122, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970).
55. G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, 143, U.N. Doc. A/9631
(1974).
56. G.A. Res. 2625, supra note 54, annex, at 123-24, 124.
57. G.A. Res. 3314, supra note 55, annex, art. 7, at 144.
58. Suttner, supra note 13, at 299.
59. Id.
60. S. AFR. CONST., supra note 28, arts. 37-52, reprinted in 14 CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 28, at South Africa 56-68. The white House of Parlia-
ment, the House of Assembly, has 178 members as compared to the Indian House of Delegates
with 45 members and the coloured House of Representatives with 85 members. Id. at South
Africa 58-60.
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Constitution as setting out two separate systems of government: "The
first consists of a Parliament and ministers in an independent state ac-
countable to a white electorate. The second is a system of rule over a
rightless and subordinate black majority by a white administration which
disown[s] a common citizenship. By their own theory and law, the rulers
of South Africa treat the majority of the population as a separate and
alien people."61
2. Illegitimacy of the Apartheid Regime
Legitimacy concerns the consent or acquiescence of the population
in the political and economic arrangements that govern their lives. 2 The
black majority of South Africa has never consented, acquiesced, or even
attempted to participate in the apartheid govenment which rules their
lives.6" In fact, the black majority has consistently rejected and struggled
against apartheid.64
The South African government has never made any genuine attempt
to involve the black population in its structures.65 The present moves
towards negotiations between the government and the ANC will not rep-
resent genuine involvment until the majority is granted citizenship.
Political legitimacy is obtained by governments in various ways: by
coercion or repression; by encouraging the participation of recalcitrant
majorities or minorities in government; by the cooption of leading dissi-
dent forces into the ruling elite; or by a democratic process, the extension
of suffrage. 6 On the basis of color, South Africa denies eighty percent of
the population minimal rights of citizenship. 67 This breach of a funda-
mental norm of international law, the right to self-determination, con-
firms its illegitimacy.68
This discussion should not imply that any resistance to a regime
makes that regime illegitimate. Government oppression does not neces-
sarily constitute suppression of the right of self-determination within the
61. Asmal, Apartheid South Africa: The Illegitimate Regime, in CENTRE AGAINST
Apartheid, Notes and Documents from the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid 5
(U.N. publ. Conf. 6, Nov. 1977) (emphasis deleted).
62. Id. at 6.
63. Indians and coloureds have voted for Members of Parliament. However, "[flewer
than twenty percent of eligible mixed-race residents and Indians voted in 1984." Chicago
Trib., Aug. 4, 1989, at C6.
64. Asmal, supra note 61, at 6. "[M]ore unfranchised blacks protested on election day
than whites voted . . . ." Washington Post, Sept. 10, 1989, at C6, col. 1.
65. Asmal, supra note 61, at 6.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 3.
68. Id. at 13.
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meaning of the United Nations Charter.6 9 The governing regime must be
colonial in nature for its constituents to have the right to self-determina-
tion. The authoritative Declaration on Principles of International Law
Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Ac-
cordance with the Charter of the United Nations states that once a col-
ony is freed from its colonialist power it has exercised its right to self-
determination within the meaning of the Charter.70 The resistance to the
South African regime is not merely a battle for a change in government.
It is a battle for independence from the racist regime and for exercise of
the South African people's right to self-determination.
IV. THE PRACTICAL RESULT OF ILLEGALITY AND
ILLEGITIMACY: THE DECREDENTIALIZATION OF
THE APARTHEID GOVERNMENT BY THE UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE
WITHDRAWAL OF COLLECTIVE RECOGNITION FROM
THE APARTHEID REGIME
As an illegal and illegitimate government, the apartheid regime has
been decredentialized in the United Nations.71 Since 1974 representa-
tives of the government of the Republic of South Africa have not been
allowed to take the seat reserved for South Africa in the General Assem-
bly of the UN.72 The credentials of the South African delegation were
rejected by both the Credentials Committee and the General Assembly.73
United Nations President Bouteflika, when asked for a ruling on the sta-
tus of the South African delegation, responded that one might legiti-
mately infer that the credentials of any delegation authorized by the
apartheid government would be similarly rejected and that this was tan-
tamount to saying that the General Assembly refuses to allow the
apartheid delegation to participate in its work.74 He interpreted the deci-
sion of the General Assembly as leaving open the question of the mem-
bership status of the Republic of South Africa in the United Nations.75
This decision continues to be left to the Security Council.7
6
69. Suttner, supra note 13, at 298.
70. Id. However, a colony is still not considered to be fully self-governing until it has
control over its entire territory, including all resources. Id.
71. Id. at 279.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Abbot, The General Assembly, 29th Session: The Decredentialization of South Africa,
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The UN decided to reject the credentials of the South African dele-
gation because the apartheid regime was not representative of the people
of South Africa and, therefore, should not be recognized. The represen-
tative of Senegal explained that his delegation objected to the acceptance
of the credentials of the representatives of South Africa:
The representatives of South Africa to the General Assembly had been
appointed by a Government which was the product of racial criteria
and, as an institution, represented only a very small fraction of the
South African population. South Africa's racial policies had repeat-
edly been condemned by the United Nations, and that country would
certainly not have been admitted as a Member of the United Nations
in 1945 had the policy of apartheid been put into law at the time. Fur-
thermore, the question under consideration was to exclude not South
Africa as a State Member of the United Nations, but solely the South
African delegation, as it could not be considered that the latter repre-
sented the country-even though black or "coloured" people had been
included this time as representatives. In conclusion, Senegal would
propose that the Committee reject the credentials of the representa-
tives of South Africa to the 29th session of the General Assembly.77
The Chairman of the Credentials Committee, speaking on behalf of
the Philippines, cited General Assembly Resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of
December 14, 1973, paragraph 11, which "declares that the South Afri-
can regime has no right to represent the people of South Africa and that
the liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African
Unity are the authentic representatives of the overwhelming majority of
the South African people."78
In the decredentialization of the South African delegation, the
United Nations effectively withdrew its recognition of the apartheid re-
gime as the de facto government of South Africa. A de facto government
exercises power over the entire territory of the state;79 a de jure govern-
ment comes into power in conformity with the constitution of the state.80
Although South Africa's apartheid regime effectively exercises power
over the territory, the UN refuses to recognize it as the de facto govern-
ment because of its illegality and illegitimacy.
The principal conditions of government recognition are representa-
tiveness (legitimacy)81 and legality.82 Of particular concern are any vio-
77. First Report of the Credentials Committee, 29 U.N. GAOR Annex (Agenda Item 3) at
2, U.N. Doc. A/9779 (1975).
78. Id. at 3.
79. See H. LAUTERPAcHT, RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 337 (1947).
80. Ia
81. First Report of the Credentials Committee, supra note 77, at 2. Although the condition
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lations of jus cogens which automatically create an obligation of
nonrecognition. 3 The apartheid regime is not a government of the peo-
ple of South Africa; it has, by its law and constitution, denied citizenship
to the majority of its population. 4 The United Nations, representing the
international community, considers the apartheid regime illegitimate81
and illegal under international law.86 Because South Africa is a colonial
power, keeping its population under subjugation in violation of the jus
cogens norms of self-determination and nondiscrimination, 7 there arises
an obligation of nonrecognition by other states, particularly other UN
member states. 8
V. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE UNITED
STATES WITH THE AFRICAN NATIONAL
CONGRESS: LOOKING TO
COLLECTIVE RECOGNITION
OF THE ANC AS A GUIDE
Just as United Nations decredentialization is indicative of a with-
drawal of collective recognition, the United Nations recognition of the
African National Congress is an act of collective recognition imbuing the
ANC with status as an international person and creating a precedent for
recognition by member states. This section examines the recognition of
the ANC by the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity,
other states, and the people of South Africa. While none of these bodies
currently recognize the ANC as the government of South Africa, they
afford the ANC status as a legitimate representative of the people.
A. Collective Recognition by the United Nations
The General Assembly of the United Nations granted observer sta-
tus to the ANC in 1975.89 By granting observer status, the UN recog-
nized the ANC as a legitimate representative of the South African
of legitimacy has been questioned by legal scholars, see, e.g., H. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 79,
at 137-38, the practice of the Credentials Committee with respect to the South African delega-
tion would indicate that representation of the governed is a condition to recognition by the
United Nations.
82. J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 135.
83. Id. at 135-36.
84. Asmal, supra note 61, at 3.
85. See id. at 8.
86. Kiapi, supra note 32, at 59.
87. Id.
88. See generally J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 81-163.
89. Cooperation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity, G.A.
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people.90 This position has been further strengthened by recent General
Assembly resolutions which proclaim the General Assembly's "full sup-
port of the national liberation movements of South Africa as the authen-
tic representatives of the South African people in its just struggle for
freedom." 91
The General Assembly has expressed its support for the national
liberation movements of Africa in a long series of annual resolutions each
entitled Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Indepen-
dence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. 9z These resolutions embody
five basic principles: (1) the resistance of liberation movements to the
colonial and racist regimes of their territories is legitimate; (2) liberation
movements may utilize "all the necessary means at their disposal" for the
termination of colonialism and racism in their territories; (3) all states
and organizations associated with the United Nations should provide
"moral and material assistance" to the movements; (4) when dealing
with matters concerning the African territories for which national libera-
tion movements exist, organizations associated with the United Nations
should provide for the representation of those movements at their delib-
erations and conferences; and (5) support for and representation by the
national liberation movements should be provided only "in consultation,
as appropriate," with the Organization of African Unity (OAU).9 3
Since the UN resolutions defer to the OAU, it is necessary to look to
the OAU's position on South Africa. The OAU has recognized both the
Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) and the African National Congress as
national liberation movements of South Africa.94 This recognition has
been confirmed and supported by the UN."
The Special Committee Against Apartheid, a committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly, associates the ANC with its work and has granted it ob-
Res. 3412, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 5, 6, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1976); G.A. Res.
3280, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 5, 5, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
90. H. GROS ESPIELL, supra note 45, at 15.
91. Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, supra note 16, at 35.
92. Travers, The Legal Effect of United Nations Action In Support of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization and the National Liberation Movements of Africa, 17 HARV. INT'L L.J. 560,
562 (1976).
93. Id. at 563-64.
94. This Note does not discuss the status of the Pan African Congress or propose that it
be recognized by the U.S. as the legitimate representative of the South African people because
it is an African nationalist organization and thus does not represent all of South Africa's peo-
ples. It also has significantly less support inside South Africa than the ANC does. See Reuter
Libr. Rep., Oct. 2, 1989 (BC cycle).
95. Murray, The 1977 Geneva Protocols and Conflict in Southern Africa, 33 INT'L &
CoMP. L.Q. 462, 464 (1984).
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server status.96 The ANC is regularly consulted in the preparation of the
Special Committee's reports to the General Assembly.97 In the Special
Committee's most recent report, the prominence of the national libera-
tion movements was noted as "demonstrat[ing] the centrality of their
role in any solution to the conflict," as well as reaffirming the legitimacy
of the struggle and urging the international community to extend all pos-
sible assistance to the people of South Africa and their national liberation
movements.98
The status of the ANC allows it to be involved in UN conferences
including the World Population Conference, the World Food Confer-
ence, the Third United Nations Conference on the Representation of
States in their Relations with International Organizations, the World
Conference of the International Women's Year, the 1976 United Nations
Conference on Human Settlements, the Conference of Plenipotentiaries
on the Establishment of an International Fund for Agricultural Develop-
ment, the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development
of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, and
the annual Conferences of Non-Aligned Countries.99 The participation
of the ANC in these conferences is indicative of recognition of the legiti-
macy of the ANC by the other conference participants.
A recent UN General Assembly resolution, Policies of Apartheid of
the Government of South Africa, reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle
of the oppressed people of South Africa for the total eradication of
apartheid and for the establishment of a nonracial, democratic society in
which all the people, irrespective of race, color, or creed, can enjoy fun-
damental freedoms and human rights."° The resolution also pays trib-
ute to organizations and individuals struggling against apartheid and
working for a nonracial, democratic society that reflects the principles of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.1"' The resolution further
reaffirms the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa and
their right to choose the necessary means, including armed resistance, to
attain the eradication of apartheid."2 The General Assembly, by this
96. Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at
26, U.N. Doc. A/10022 (1975).
97. Travers, supra note 92, at 567 n.22.
98. Report of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 22) at
29, 31-32, U.N. Doc. A/42/22 (1987).
99. Travers, supra note 92, at 567 nn.18-22.
100. Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, G.A. Res. 43/50, 43 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 49, 55, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 49.
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resolution, also reaffirms its commitment to supporting the national lib-
eration movements in South Africa, calling on all states, intergovernmen-
tal and nongovernmental organizations, mass media, city and other local
authorities, and individuals to increase political, economic, educational,
legal, humanitarian, and all other forms of necessary assistance to the
people of South Africa and their national liberation movements. 103
The General Assembly specifically urges all countries to contribute
generously to the Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism, and
Apartheid Fund set up by the Eighth Conference of Heads of State of
Governments of Non-Aligned Countries with the aim of increasing sup-
port to the liberation movements fighting the apartheid regime and to the
front-line states which border South Africa."° The UN has also decided
to continue funding the South African liberation movements recognized
by the Organization of African Unity, enabling the African National
Congress and the Pan Africanist Congress to maintain offices in New
York. 105
The language of recent UN resolutions, calling for the establishment
of a nonracial, democratic society in which all the people, irrespective of
race, color, or creed, enjoy fundamental freedoms and human rights, 1 6 is
very similar to the language of the ANC's principal political platform,
the Freedom Charter, which begins:
That South Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and
that no Government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the
will of all the people; ... that only a democratic State, based on the
will of all the people, can secure to all their birthrights without distinc-
tion of colour, race, sex or belief .... 0 7
This alignment of the UN with the ANC's ideals can be read as further
evidence of recognition of their status.
B. Collective Recognition by the Members of the Organization of
African Unity
The United Nations recognition of the ANC is stated in terms of the
recognition of South African national liberation movements by the Or-
103. Id. at 50.
104. Id
105. Id.
106. Id at 55.
107. The Freedom Charter, June 1955, reprinted in CENTRE AGAINST Apartheid, Notes
and Documents from the World Conference for Action Against Apartheid I (U.N. publ. June
1978).
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ganization of African Unity. °8 In 1963 the UN adopted Resolution
2555, recommending that specialized agencies support liberation strug-
gles "in co-operation with the OAU and through it, with the national
liberation movements" and requesting that the specialized agencies "es-
tablish relationships and other special arrangements with the the
OAU."' 1 9 This resolution led to an agreement of cooperation between
UNESCO and the OAU and to invitations by various specialized agen-
cies to the ANC and the PAC to sit as observers." 0 Recently, the OAU
endorsed the ANC's proposal for a negotiated settlement with the cur-
rent South African regime.' The OAU recognized the ANC and the
PAC as the authentic liberation movements of South Africa in AHG/
Resolution 34(11) stating that "the Assembly 'Invites the South African
liberation movements to concert their policies and actions and intensify
the struggle for full equality, and appeals to all States to lend moral and
material assistance to the liberation movements in their struggle.' "112
Another important recognition of the ANC by the OAU came with
the establishment of the African Liberation Committee (originally
known as the Committee of Nine) in 1963.'"
The Liberation Committee, like the UN, extends influential recogni-
tion to national liberation movements. Recognition by the Liberation
Committee gives liberation movements access to funding from donor
countries, access to the OAU and UN conferences, and the right to par-
ticipate in debates and to initiate resolutions on issues involving their
territories." 4 To be recognized, a national liberation movement must
meet certain criteria including a demonstrated success in the battlefield
or a popular following.' This recognition imbues a group with interna-
108. The UN appealed to all states, organizations, and institutions to increase humanita-
rian, legal, educational, and other such assistance and support to the victims of apartheid, to
the liberation movements recognized by the Organization of African Unity and for a non-
racial, democratic society in South Africa. Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South
Africa, supra note 100, at 55.
109. G.A. Res. 2555, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 70, 70, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969).
110. Gorelick, supra note 48, at 78-79.
111. Washington Post, Sept. 25, 1989, at A17. The ANC claims that this recognition of the
OAU (and the endorsements of the eight front-line states and the Nonaligned Movement) is in
preparation for the proposal's adoption as a UN Security Council Resolution. Id.
112. Gorelick, supra note 48, at 80 n.45.
113. Stokes, External Liberation Movements, in RACE AND POLITICS IN SouTH AFRICA
208-09 (I. Robertson & P. Whitten eds. 1978).
114. C.O.C. AMATE, INSIDE THE OAU: PAN-AFRICANISM IN PRACTICE 283 (1986).
115. See Folz & Widner, The CA U and Southern African Liberation, in THE OAU AFTER
TWENTY YEARS 262 (Y. El-Ayouty & I. Zartman eds. 1984); see, e.g., Stokes, supra note 113,
at 209. The Liberation Committee temporarily withdrew its recognition of the Pan African
Congress in 1967 because of the organization's ineffectiveness and continued refusal to form a
[Vol. 13
The African National Congress and Apartheid
tional personality and legitimacy.
The OAU's recognition of the national liberation movements, be-
sides providing them with status in the United Nations, is an expression
of the moral and material support of all OAU member states. 1 6 Recog-
nition of the ANC by the OAU, like the UN, is evidence of the collective
recognition of the ANC as the representative of the South African people
and implies that under international law there is an obligation of recogni-
tion by other states.
Since the recent release of Nelson Mandela and the unbanning of the
ANC, the OAU has reiterated its stand of opposition to the apartheid
government and its support for the African National Congress.' 1 7
C. Independent Recognition by Individual States
In February 1990 the ANC was invited to attend a summit meeting
of the Frontline States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania,
Zambia and Zimbabwe.)"' In 1984, the leaders of Angola, Cape-Verde,
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Sao-Tome, and Principe met in Maputo,
Mozambique, and expressed their solidarity with the ANC. 119
The South African Development Coordination Conference
(SADCC), comprised of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi,
Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, and Tanzania was formed
in 1979.120 Its objectives are: (1) reduction of economic dependence, es-
pecially on South Africa; (2) forging links to create a genuine and equita-
ble regional integration; and (3) mobilization of resources to promote
national, interstate, and regional policy.121 Like the OAU, SADCC is a
voice of collective recognition expressing the support of its member states
for the liberation of Southern Africa. SADCC has expressed its recogni-
united front with the ANC. This recognition was restored in 1968 and the Liberation Com-
mittee continues to recognize both the ANC and the PAC. Id.
116. Kapunga, The OA U's Support for the Liberation of Southern Africa, in THE ORGANI-
ZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY AFTER TEN YEARS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 141 (Y. EI-
Ayouty ed. 1975).
117. See Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 16, 1990 (BC cycle). "The Organization of African Unity
urged governments on Friday to maintain economic sanctions against South Africa as pressure
on Pretoria to scrap apartheid." Id. See also Inter Press Serv., Feb. 2, 1990 (The liberation
committee welcomed the unbanning of the ANC but said that more changes are needed before
the committee would accept de Klerk's moves to end apartheid in South Africa.).
118. Reuter Libr. Rep., Feb. 21, 1990 (AM Cycle).
119. Gorelick, supra note 48, at 82.
120. Jaffee, The Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference, in SOUTH AFRI-
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tion of the ANC by inviting its representatives to participate in confer-
ences as an observer.1 22
Outside southern Africa, the ANC has offices in Algeria, Angola,
Australia, Belgium, Canada, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland,
France, the German Democratic Republic, German Federal Republic,
India, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Madagascar, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway,
Senegal, Sweden, Tanzania, the United Kingdom, the United States, the
USSR, and Zambia. 123 It is difficult to generalize about the status of the
ANC in each host country. While Cuba, Kenya, the German Demo-
cratic Republic, the Soviet Union, and all of the Scandanavian countries
have granted the ANC full diplomatic status, other countries have given
varying degrees of status to the ANC missions. 24 Mozambique has
granted "quasi-diplomatic" status to the ANC. 125 The Angolan govern-
ment claims that there are no ANC military bases inside Angola but that
it does offer moral and diplomatic support to the ANC.126 Zimbabwean
President Robert Mugabe in 1988 reiterated his country's diplomatic and
material support for the ANC. 127
VI. RECOGNITION OF THE ANC BY THE PEOPLE OF
SOUTH AFRICA
When the United States government reviews the status of the ANC
and the option of affording the ANC status as a legitimate representative
of the South African people, it should look not only to the collective
recognition of the ANC by other states but also to the recognition of the
ANC by the people of South Africa. This recognition is evidence of the
ANC's representativeness and, thereby, its legitimacy. 28
Because the ANC has been banned in South Africa, 12 9 it has been
difficult to document support and recognition of the ANC in the country
itself. In the next few months, groups and individuals will be aligning
with the ANC, and there will be a true measure of the ANC's representa-
122. Id. at 29.
123. 42 SECHABA OFFICIAL ORGAN OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS SouTH AF-
RICA, at inside back cover (Jan. 1990).
124. Telephone interview with Neo Mnumzana, former Chief Representative of the ANC
to the United Nations (Aug. 14, 1988). The Soviets have completely broken off relations with
the apartheid regime while providing both arms and diplomatic support to the ANC. Chicago
Trib., July 27, 1989, at C2. Regarding Zambia, see L.A. Times, May 5, 1989, at 9, col. 4.
125. Reuter Libr. Rep., Dec. 27, 1988 (AM cycle).
126. Inter Press Serv., Dec. 21, 1988.
127. Xinhau Gen. Overseas News Serv., June 28, 1988, Item No. 0628039.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 62.
129. See Stokes, supra note 113, at 204.
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tive status. 130 However, until the ANC is truly operative within South
Africa, we must look to the public support of other anti-apartheid groups
such as the Congress of South African Trade Unions and the United
Democratic Front, members of the Mass Democratic Movement.
13 1
Since the unbanning of the ANC, these groups have openly called them-
selves ANC allies.132 These anti-apartheid groups have adopted the
Freedom Charter and support the same democratic ideals as the ANC. 1
33
Since the unbanning of the ANC, these groups have begun considering
mergers or affiliations with the ANC.134
A. The Largest Trade Union in South Africa Supports the ANC
The trade union movement in South Africa is an overtly political
movement which takes active stands against apartheid policies as well as
performing traditional collective bargaining functions.' 35 The Congress
of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest union, has over a
million members.' 36 Founded in 1985, it is a federation of fourteen affili-
ated unions. COSATU announced its fraternity with the ANC in a
meeting in Lusaka in 1985'13 and signed the Freedom Charter in 1987.138
Elijah Barayi, COSATU's first president, was a member of the ANC
before it was banned.' 3 9 At the time of COSATU's formation, "[a]
COSATU representative observed that the new organization shared
many political objectives with the ANC. At an impromptu press confer-
ence after the new federation was launched, Barayi told reporters that
COSATU hoped to fill the vacuum that has existed since 1960, when the
ANC was banned."'"' In December 1989, shortly before Mandela's re-
lease, a five member delegation of COSATU met with Nelson Mandela in
prison to exchange views on the situation in South Africa. A representa-
130. At some point there will be an election at which true legitimacy will be decided, but
until then the United States may look to groups and individuals as evidence of which groups
are legitimate representatives.
131. The Mass Democratic movement is the new umbrella group of the anti-apartheid or-
ganizations. Its spokesperson, Murphy Morobe, was a former officer of the ANC, and many
consider that the group is inspired and led by the ANC from its headquarters in Lusaka,
Zambia. DeKlerk, Risk a Leap Toward Negotiations, L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1989, at B5, col. -3.
132. Christian Sci. Monitor, Feb. 26, 1990, at 3.
133. M. ORKIN, DISINVEsTMENT: THE STRUGGLE AND THE FUTURE 48 (1986).
134. ANC Newsbriefing, Feb. 4, 1990, at 3, col. 3.
135. Christian Sci. Monitor, June 6, 1988, at 9.
136. S. DAVIS, APARTHEID'S REBELS 165-66 (1987).
137. Id.
138. Christian Sci. Monitor, Aug. 31, 1987, at 7.
139. Christian Sci. Monitor, Dec. 6, 1985, at 21.
140. Id.
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tive of COSATU noted that Mandela was able to act as a liason between
the government and the mass democratic movement.'41 This statement
further evidences the recognition and respect accorded COSATU and the
ANC.
B. UDF Membership Reflects Support for the ANC
Like the trade unions, community groups in South Africa play dual
roles as community organizers working for social change and political
movements working for political change. The United Democratic Front
(UDF) is a coalition of anti-apartheid community organizations. 42
Nearly 700 community bodies (civic organizations, women's groups,
labor unions, youth leagues, and religious councils) are affiliated with the
UDF.'43 Since the unbanning of the ANC, the UDF has come out
openly as its ally.'" Although the UDF is still independent of the ANC,
its political philosophy, leadership, and strategies all reflect compatible
political goals.' 45 Some of the campaigns of the UDF directly recognize
the ANC's status as the authentic liberation movement of the South Afri-
can people. 146 The UDF campaigned to free jailed ANC leader Nelson
Mandela and to unban the ANC, and many of the UDF leaders were
former officers of the ANC. 147 Bishop Desmond Tutu, patron of the
UDF, has called for western leaders to support the efforts of the ANC. 141
As Bishop Tutu put it, the ANC "sought to change an unjust system
peacefully, non-violently, [until] they were sent into the arms of the
struggle through violence because the West abandoned us.'
1 49
141. Xinhau Gen. Overseas News Serv., Dec. 20, 1989, Item No. 1220209.
142. S. DAVIS, supra note 136, at 87.
143. Id.
144. On the day of Mandela's release, Patrick Lekota, an ANC leader and publicity secre-
tary for the UDF, said that Mandela would continue to be the leader of black South Africans.
The Boston Globe, Feb. 11, 1990, Metro, at 8 (city ed.). See supra notes 132-34 and accompa-
nying text.
145. S. DAVIS, supra note 136, at 87 (for example, the goals of releasing all political prison-
ers, repeal of the Group Areas Act, and universal suffrage).
146. See id. at 77-115.
147. For example, Henry Mutile Fazzie, UDF leader in Port Elizabeth, had served as a
commander in Umkhonto we Sizwe during the ANC's 1961-63 sabotage campaign, and
Archie Gumede and Oscar Mpetha are both UDF officers and former ANC campaign veter-
ans. S. DAVIS, supra note 136, at 88.
148. M. ORKIN, supra note 133, at 48.
149. Id. In addition to being the 1988 winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, Bishop Tutu is
General Secretary of the SACC (South African Council of Churches) and a patron of the
National Forum, both of which are active anti-apartheid organizations.
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C. Recognition of the ANC by the Business Community
The white business community of South Africa, recognizing the in-
evitability of the end of apartheid, has begun to open discussions with the
ANC in an attempt to equate the goals of black power with corporate
interests in a system that preserves free enterprise.150 A whirlwind of
critical declarations, resolutions, and advertisements since the 1976
Soweto riots culminated in a highly publicized 1985 summit in Zambia of
corporate executives led by Gavin Relly, chairman of Anglo-American
Corporation, and ANC delegates. 51 Additionally, in 1987 a moderate,
largely Afrikaaner group, the Institute of Democratic Alternatives for
South Africa (IDASA), led by former Progressive Federal Party leader,
Fredrik van zyl Slabbert, held a well publicized meeting with the ANC in
Dakar, Senegal.' 52 In July 1989 IDASA again met with the ANC at its
offices in Lusaka.'53 IDASA "has been responsible for large numbers of
liberal whites and dissident Afrikaners meeting exiled members of the
outlawed African National Congress (ANC) and opening a dialogue." '154
VII. THE UNITED STATES PRACTICE OF
RECOGNITION
In recent years the U.S. has not articulated its foreign policy in
terms of recognition. It has instead blurred the distinction between for-
mal recognition and diplomatic relations.'55 The United States policy
most closely follows the Estrada Doctrine,156 a policy of recognizing only
new states and not new governments. 157 However, the U.S. does not ad-
here strictly to this doctrine when it perceives a major political advantage
in using recognition as an instrument of foreign policy.' 58 The situation
in Angola is an example. The U.S. continues to withhold diplomatic re-
lations from the MPLA because it favors the policy of Jonas Savimbi's
UNITA movement. 159 Secretary of State Kissinger justified this nonrec-
ognition as a policy of refusal to recognize new governments who have
150. S. DAVIS, supra note 136, at 165.
151. Id. at 97.
152. Rotberg, The Collapse of South Africa's White Politics, Christian Sci. Monitor, Mar.
16, 1988, at 13.
153. Inter Press Serv., July 10,1989.
154. Christian Sci. Monitor, Jan. 23, 1990, The World, at 4.
155. L.T. GALLOWAY, supra note 6, at 147.
156. Id. at 149.
157. Id. at 8.
158. Id. at 124-25.
159. Id. at 121-23.
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seized power with the help of outside forces. 160
The U.S. recognizes the state of South Africa but has not addressed
the dilemma of government recognition because it sees political advan-
tages to a continued relationship with the apartheid regime. 161 Chester
Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from 1981 to
1989, explaining the U.S. constructive engagement policy in South Af-
rica, said that the United States was "'compet(ing) with our global ad-
versary in the politics of a changing region whose future depends on
those who participate in shaping it.' ",162
The U.S. policy of ignoring the question of government recognition
is unsatisfactory with respect to the situation in South Africa. Although
the state of South Africa exists and the apartheid regime facially controls
the state, the United States, as a member of the international community,
is obligated to derecognize the apartheid regime. 163 Correspondingly,
there is an obligation to recognize the African National Congress as a
legitimate representative of the people of South Africa.
The United States should abide by the law of collective recognition
with respect to its foreign policy in South Africa. In considering when to
grant diplomatic status, the U.S. should first consider the status of the
apartheid government and the ANC as "international entities" by look-
ing to collective recognition by the United Nations. 1I 4 Second, it should
consider the representativeness of the government and the people's right
to self-determination. In the same way that the Credentials Committee
of the UN considered these factors in derecognizing the present
apartheid regime in South Africa, these factors should be considered in
the determination of whom to recognize.
VIII. CONCLUSION: EVALUATING UNITED STATES
POLICY WITH RESPECT TO SOUTH AFRICA
Governments are regarded as legitimate whose power derives from
the customs and values prevalent in the society. 165 These customs and
values are demonstrated by the choices of the eligible political partici-
pants in society.' 66 As the South African people have not yet exercised
160. Id. at 122.
161. See generally Crocker, Southern Africa: Eight Years Later, 68 FOREIGN AFF. 144 (Fall
1989).
162. Id. at 145.
163. See supra text accompanying note 88.
164. See generally J. DUGARD, supra note 5, at 41-80.
165. A. IWANSKA, EXILED GOVERNMENTS: SPANISH AND POLISH 11 (1981).
166. Id.
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their right to self-determination, they are not political participants in the
present apartheid government. Until they have exercised this right and
become political participants, the South African government will not be
legitimate. The legitimate liberation movement of the South African
people, the ANC, is the chosen representative of the people in interna-
tional relations and should be afforded diplomatic status.
The next logical step in the legitimate struggle of the oppressed peo-
ple of South Africa for the "total eradication of apartheid and for the
establishment of a nonracial democratic society in which all people, irre-
spective of race, color or creed, enjoy fundamental freedoms and human
rights"167 is diplomatic recognition of the African National Congress by
other states.
The United States can and should take this step.
167. Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, supra note 100, at 55.
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